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ORTS is "a body of law which is directed toward the compensa-
tion of individuals ... for losses which they have suffered within
the scope of their legally recognized interests . "..."- The law of
torts is "concerned with the allocation of losses arising out of . . . the
various and ever-increasing clashes of the activities of persons living in
common society . *"2 And the purpose of tort law "is to adjust these
losses, and to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as
the result of the conduct of another."
3
In applying these principals, courts have developed a framework for
ascribing liability, where the central idea is that liability is "based upon
conduct that is socially unreasonable."'4 The first step in the analysis in-
quires whether the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff. If a duty exists,
the second step in the analysis addresses breach of that duty. Did the
defendant act in a socially unreasonable manner that breached a duty?
The third step in the analysis considers causation. Did the defendant's
actions result in the plaintiff's injuries? And the final step addresses
damages that the defendant might owe for the plaintiff's injuries.
In earlier times, the jury was the entity that determined what socially
reasonable or unreasonable conduct was, viewing the actors' conduct ob-
jectively in light of the circumstances. For several years, special interest
groups, who do not trust or appreciate juries, have successfully lobbied
the Texas Legislature to define in the abstract what is reasonable or un-
reasonable. To the extent the Texas Legislature has been unwilling to
undermine the jury, politically motivated courts have taken up the task
by casting aside decades, even centuries of common law precedent to
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"limit" the role of lay jurors in deciding societal norms. The result is
more economic certainty in the macro sense, but at a high cost. Juries are
less respected, making jury duty much less meaningful. Since statutes are
not enacted or debated with individual cases or circumstances in mind,
justice becomes a "one size fits all" system that often fits no one. In a
country where individuality and personal liberty are still popular notions,
codifying tort compensation is an area where economic "conservatives"
use socialistic state control to their advantage.
II. DUTY
Several cases during the survey period examined the existence of legal
duties and common law causes of action.
A. THE DUTY TO WARN-HUMBLE SAND & GRAVEL, INC. V.
GOMEZ, 146 S.W.3D 170 (TEX. 2004)
In Gomez, the Texas Supreme Court ignored the basic premise that a
manufacturer has a duty to warn users of its products' dangerous charac-
teristics and instead established a complicated and vague set of duty fac-
tors that mix issues of duty and causation. 5 The Texas Supreme Court
questioned whether a manufacturer had a duty to place warnings on its
product, even though the defendant's product was extremely hazardous,
the defendant knew about these hazards, the burden of including a warn-
ing was inconsequential, the injured plaintiff would have read and heeded
an adequate warning, and but for the product, the plaintiff would not
have acquired an incurable and potentially fatal disease.
Raymond Gomez contracted silicosis while working around abrasive
blasting for about six and one-half years. Gomez filed suit against more
than twenty defendants, all of whom settled except Humble Sand &
Gravel Co., one of the suppliers of flint used in abrasive blasting. In ajury trial, Gomez obtained a judgment against Humble for about $2 mil-
lion. Humble appealed, arguing that it had no duty to warn of the dan-
gers of silicosis because: (1) the dangers were well known in the abrasive
blasting industry; (2) Humble sold only to industrial customers; and (3)
Humble was entitled to rely on its industrial customers to provide their
own employees, like Gomez, with necessary warnings. The court of ap-
peals rejected Humble's arguments and affirmed the jury's verdict.6
Gomez was exposed to fine particles of silica in his abrasive blasting
work. Inhaling fine particles of free silica, over even months, causes sili-
cosis, "an incurable disease involving afibrosis scarring of the lungs" that
can eventually result in death. The health risks associated with inhaling
silica dust had been known in the industry and medical community for a
long time.7
5. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 146 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2004).
6. Id. at 173, 180.
7. Id. at 174.
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Abrasive blasting with flint can be performed relatively safely if work-
ers wear suitable protective equipment. U.S. Occupational Health and
Safety Administration (OSHA) regulations require employers to supply
respirators or air-fed hoods to protect workers that conduct abrasive
blasting. Accordingly, companies conducting abrasive blasting opera-
tions, including Gomez's employers, were at least somewhat aware of
these health hazards. However, employees conducting the abrasive blast-
ing, including Gomez, were not aware of the risks. Further, the employ-
ers' knowledge of the risks did not translate into safe work practices.
8
Humble sold flint in bulk and in one-hundred-pound bags only to in-
dustrial customers, including Gomez's employer. Humble knew of the
health hazards associated with breathing silica dust, but included only a
fairly benign warning on its bags. The understated warning did not iden-
tify death as a possible outcome of improper use and did not identify
proper protective equipment necessary for safe use.9
Gomez read the inadequate warnings on the Humble bags and did not
have an appreciation for the real risk associated with breathing the dust
created by abrasive blasting operations-that he could die. Although he
wore proper protective equipment in the limited area his air-fed hood
reached, he often worked at jobs that created dust (like cleaning) and he
entered and left dusty areas without any protective equipment. 10
The existence of a legal duty and the elements of any duty are ques-
tions of law." The jury considered Humble's conduct under two separate
legal theories, products liability and negligence, but the Texas Supreme
Court did not consider the differences between the two and assumed the
duty to warn was the same under both theories.12 The Texas Supreme
Court held that several factors should be considered and balanced in de-
termining whether a duty exists, including
social, economic, and political questions, . . . the risk, foreseeability,
and likelihood of injury, the social utility of the actor's conduct, the
magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury against the
consequences of placing the burden on the defendant . . . [and]
whether one party would generally have superior knowledge of the
risk or a right to control the actor who caused the harm.
13
The plaintiff, as a general rule, "must establish the existence of a
duty."1 4 In Gomez, however, the Texas Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant Humble had the burden of showing it had no duty to warn.
15 The
8. Id. at 174-95.
9. Id. at 176.
10. Id. at 178-79.
11. Id. at 181.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 182 (citing Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. 1993); Greater Houston
Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990); Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668
S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983); Praesel v. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d 391, 397-98 (Tex. 1998)).
14. Id. at 182-83 (citing Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1989)).
15. Id. at 195.
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Texas Supreme Court noted that, "in most circumstances, a supplier's
duty to warn is simply assumed."' 16 And "circumstances, in which that
assumption is not warranted .... are more the exception than the rule. 17
The Texas Supreme Court also stated suppliers, like Humble, are more
likely to have access to the "evidence regarding the efficacy or inefficacy"
of their warnings. 18 Further, the court noted that "other cases tend to
treat the intermediary issue generally as defensive," and therefore, the
burden of proving no duty to warn should properly be on the defendant
Humble. 19
The Texas Supreme Court stated that a "supplier has no duty to warn of
risks involved in a product's use that are commonly known to foreseeable
users, even if some users are not aware of them."'20 The Texas Supreme
Court defined "commonly" as "beyond dispute" and stated that it does
not require that something is universally known.21 Because the Texas Su-
preme Court concluded that the dangers of inhaling silica dust were well
known among flint suppliers and abrasive blasting operators, the Texas
Supreme Court concluded that Humble had no duty to warn its custom-
ers, the abrasive blasting operators.22
However, as the dissent points out, the abrasive blasting operators'
knowledge of these hazards is not as clear as the majority opinion im-
plies. 23 The abrasive blasting operators knew there was some risk be-
cause OSHA required protective equipment and these abrasive blasting
operators provided that protective equipment. 24 However, the provided
safety equipment and the enforcement of safe work practices were so in-
adequate that the dissent makes a compelling argument that the opera-
tors did not truly appreciate the risk, both in terms of the minimal
amounts of exposure that can lead to disease and the minimal amounts of





20. Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
21. Id. (citing Am. Tomacco v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 427 (Tex. 1997) (quoting
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991)). As contrast-ing examples of what is "commonly" known, the court cited to cases which analyzed dan-gers of alcohol and tobacco use. In Seagram, the Court concluded that the "dangers of
alcoholism from prolonged and excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages was commonknowledge among the public, even though the plaintiffs in that case asserted that they were
themselves personally unaware of this danger." Id. (citing Seagram, 814 S.W.2d at 388).
But in Grinnell, the Court concluded that "while the general health risks of smoking were
common knowledge, the specific risk of addiction continued to be disputed by the tobaccoindustry itself and thus could not be said to be common knowledge among smokers." Id.(citing Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 427).
22. Id. at 184-85.
23. Id. at 199-201.
24. Id. at 175.
25. Id. at 199-201. For example, the vice president and head of safety at one of the
companies where Gomez worked stated that he himself walked through the blasting areas
where dangerous dust was present with no protective equipment and he stated that he
thought it was just "nuisance dust." Id. at 201. Further, studies done by the National
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not know about the danger and real risk or it knew about the risk and
intentionally ignored it and put its employees at grave risk of death. The
Texas Supreme Court appeared to opt for the latter, but without really
acknowledging the implication of its judgment; the implication being that
the companies acted in at least a grossly negligent manner, but probably
even intentionally inflicted fatal diseases on their employees.
The Texas Supreme Court began its duty analysis with a review of two
cases finding that manufacturers had no duty to warn end users where the
manufacturer only sold to an intermediary. 26 In Alm v. Aluminum Co. of
America, the Texas Supreme Court held that "a manufacturer or supplier
may, in certain situations, depend on an intermediary to communicate a
warning to the ultimate user of a product. '27 In Alm,
an aluminum cap had popped off a soda bottle and struck [the plain-
tiff] in the eye. Alcoa manufactured the machine that fastened the
cap to the bottle top, and [the plaintiff] claimed Alcoa should have
warned him of the risk that a cap could pop off. But the machine
Alcoa manufactured was owned and operated by an independent
bottler and Alcoa did not control the bottling process ... and had no
practical way of reaching consumers with any warning.
28
In that situation, the Texas Supreme Court concluded "Alcoa should be
able to satisfy its duty to warn consumers by proving that its intermediary
[the bottler] was adequately trained and warned, familiar with the
propensities of the product, and capable of passing on a warning."'29 The
Texas Supreme Court also "noted that other courts had held that a phar-
maceutical manufacturer is not required to warn patients of the dangers
of a prescription drug as long as physicians who prescribe the drug,
'learned intermediaries,' have been adequately warned."'30 The Texas Su-
preme Court stated that "in both situations ... it would be reasonable for
the supplier to rely on the intermediary to warn the ultimate con-
sumer."' 31 But the Texas Supreme Court cautioned:
the mere presence of an intermediary does not excuse the manufac-
turer from warning those whom it should reasonably expect to be
endangered by the use of its product. The issue in every case is
whether the original manufacturer has a reasonable assurance that its
Institute for Occupational Health and Safety in the early 1970s showed that the safety
practices in the industry were deplorable and that companies appeared to be unaware of
the problems with silica dust or the deficiencies in safety equipment and practices. Id. at
175. As the dissent points out, these studies predate Gomez's exposure by about ten years,
but they clearly show that even though the dangers of silica dust had been documented
over forty years prior to those studies, the abrasive blasting industry still did not fully
appreciate the danger. Id. at 201.
26. See id. at 185.
27. Id. (quoting Alm v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tex.1986)).
28. Id.
29. Id. (quoting Alm, 717 S.W.2d at 592).





warning will reach those endangered by the use of its product.32
Because the Texas Supreme Court held that Humble had no duty to
warn the abrasive blasting operators of anything related to its products,
the narrower issue became whether Humble had a duty to warn end
users, i.e. employees who used Humble's product, of the product's dan-
gers. 33 The Texas Supreme Court addressed this issue by reviewing the
individual duty factors it had identified.
The Texas Supreme Court analyzed the first factor, likelihood of seri-
ous injury from a supplier's failure to warn.34 The Texas Supreme Court
stated that "[s]ilicosis, unquestionably a serious injury, is likely to result
from working around silica dust without properly using protective equip-
ment."'35 But the Texas Supreme Court stated "[wihether such injury was
also likely to result from a supplier's failure to warn workers of the seri-
ousness of silicosis and the importance of wearing an air-fed hood is far
from clear on the record before us."' 36 Essentially, the Texas Supreme
Court focused on the "issue" identified in Alm, "whether the original
manufacturer has a reasonable assurance that its warning will reach those
endangered by the use of its product. '37 The Texas Supreme Court stated
that the record did not reflect "whether flint was supplied mostly in bags
or in bulk ... [and] there [was] no evidence that it was feasible for bulk
sellers to warn their customers' employees .... ,,38 Further, the Texas
Supreme Court stated the record was "completely silent on whether it
was common in the industry for blasting workers to handle bags."' 39 Thus,
it was "unclear whether warnings printed on bags could ordinarily have
been expected to reach blasting workers. '40 Perhaps one of the most ap-
palling comments was the court's statement that Humble might not have
a duty to warn because "[e]ven if blasting workers ordinarily saw bag
labels, there is some suggestion at least that the warnings would have
been ineffectual, that they would have continued on in their jobs out of
economic necessity."'41 The Texas Supreme Court, in effect, condemns a
class of workers as too ignorant and powerless to bother warning.
Even though evidence established that Gomez would have seen a
warning if Humble provided it, he would have understood it, and he
would have never continued to work as a blaster if he read an adequate
warning, the Texas Supreme Court identified this as a "fluke" and stated
there was "nothing in the record" that showed failure to provide ade-
quate warnings increased the likelihood of serious injury.42
32. Id. (citing Alm, 717 S.W.2d at 591 (emphasis added)).
33. Id. at 185-86.
34. Id. at 192-93.
35. Id. at 192.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 185 (citing Aim, 717 S.W.2d at 591).




42. Id. at 192-93.
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In analyzing the second factor, the Texas Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that the "record establishe[d] that the burden on a supplier of flint
in bags is either inconsequential or nonexistent.
43
With regard to the third factor, the court stated that "it was obviously
feasible for suppliers to print warning labels on bags," but then the court
stated it was "not clear from the record whether such labels would have
reached blasting workers or would have reduced the risk of silicosis if
they had" reached the workers. 44 Here, the court confused duty with
causation in broad sweeping terms. The Texas Supreme Court stated the
"feasibility of printing words on a bag is not in any doubt, but the feasibil-
ity of using that medium to communicate any meaningful warning effec-
tively is."'45 Then the court focused on the proper use of safety
equipment, stating that the problem was proper use of protective equip-
ment and it was not up to Humble to ensure that it was properly used.
46
The court, however, misses the point. Neither the employees, nor the
operators understood the importance of wearing protective equipment or
wearing it properly because they did not understand the risk associated
with NOT using it. That is the essence of any warning. Had the warnings
been adequate, then the employees could have sought more information
from the operators on proper protective equipment use and would have
practiced greater diligence in ensuring proper use. Regardless, these are
issues of causation or comparative fault, not duty.
Under the Texas Supreme Court's fourth factor, the reliability of oper-
ators to warn their own employees, the Texas Supreme Court again
stretched for an excuse to not find a duty. The court stated, "the record
establishes that [the abrasive blasting operators] routinely neglected
safety measures and did not warn employees" even though they "knew
the dangers of working around silica dust, were in a far better position
than flint suppliers to warn their own employees of those dangers, and
could have reduced or eliminated altogether the risk of silicosis by follow-
ing federal regulations. '47 But then the court stated, "there is no evi-
dence that any government agency or industrial safety group ever
considered that safety could be improved by suppliers' warnings."' 48 This
does not have anything to do with "the reliability of operators to warn
their own employees." It appears that the Texas Supreme Court was sim-
ply trying to justify not finding a duty.
Under the court's fifth factor, the existence and efficacy of other pro-
tections, the court stated that "the existence of a comprehensive regula-
tory scheme to protect against norm weighs against imposing a common
law duty to accomplish the same result if the scheme affords significant








protections. '49 The court noted that OSHA regulations prescribed stan-
dards for abrasive blasting that were legally enforceable against operators
and that, if followed, would have provided safe working conditions. '50
But the Texas Supreme Court also noted that "evidence [was] over-
whelming that the regulations were widely disregarded and as a practical
matter, afforded workers little protection."' 51 If an adequate warning had
existed, workers would be in a position to question the non-compliance of
their employers because they would have known non-compliance was
dangerous.
Under the Texas Supreme Court's sixth factor, the social utility of re-
quiring, or not requiring, suppliers to warn, the court stated "[r]equiring
suppliers to warn would avoid some injuries, including Gomez's, but
shifting responsibility away from operators might lessen even further
their incentives to provide a safe working environment, ultimately result-
ing in injuries to more workers than if warnings were not given. '52 The
lack of logic or coherent thought is astounding. The Texas Supreme
Court, in essence, stated if you warn an employee that a product is dan-
gerous, their employer may not provide them the equipment necessary to
use it safely because the warning to use safety equipment might lead em-
ployers to think their employees do not need it.
In balancing these factors, the Texas Supreme Court stated it could not
determine from the record whether a duty should or should not be im-
posed on flint suppliers, such as Humble, to provide their customers' em-
ployees with warnings. 53 The Texas Supreme Court stated:
If most of the harm to abrasive blasting workers was due to the use
of flint supplied in bulk, it would be a perverse result if the responsi-
bility for injury fell solely on those doing the least harm-suppliers
who sold flint in bags. If abrasive blasting workers do not ordinarily
see bag labels, it would do little good to require that the labels be
more specific. And if abrasive blasting operators persistently require
their employees to work in unsafe conditions, it is not clear that the
purposes of imposing a duty to warn-encouraging care and protect-
ing users-can be advanced by requiring flint suppliers to warn that
those conditions are indeed unsafe. 54
As the dissent so aptly pointed out, the majority conflated duty and
causation to create vague and ambiguous guidelines for determining
whether a duty exists. 55 As characterized by the dissent:
49. Id. at 193-94 (citing Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc. v. Solomon, 106 S.W.3d 705,
714-715 (Tex. 2003) (holding that a common law duty to use ordinary care in taking urine
specimens for drug tests should not be imposed on employers when there is a "comprehen-
sive statutory and regulatory scheme" already in place that "affords significant protection
to employees who are the subject of random drug tests").





55. Id. at 197.
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Humble had no duty to warn potential users of its product's dangers
if it can demonstrate that, industry-wide: (1) some/most/all (it's un-
clear from the Court's opinion) operators used bulk-supplied rather
than bagged flint; (2) any warning given would not have reached
some/most/all (it's unclear) blasting workers; and/or (3) some/most/
all (it's unclear) blasting workers would have disregarded the
warning.56
The dissent argued that the court subverted the analysis developed in
Alm, by ignoring its fundamental premise that "a product manufacturer
has a duty to inform users of potential hazards associated with the prod-
uct."'57 The dissent recognized that exceptions to the general rule exist,
but such exceptions, "have been narrowly tailored to situations where (1)
the manufacturer would have difficulty in providing a warning itself; and
(2) 'its intermediary was adequately trained and warned, familiar with the
propensities of the product, and capable of passing on a warning." 58
"[T]he Court's abandonment of fundamental products-liability principles
is an attempt to judicially cabin widespread and oft-abused mass-tort
claims that have arisen from latent workplace injuries caused by sub-
stances like silica and asbestos."'59 "But as the United States Supreme
Court has recognized, the solution to these problems is legislative, not
judicial."'60 Gomez is an example of pure judicial legislation by anti-
worker activist judges.
B. DUTIES OWED BY A POSSESSOR OF LAND-MILITARY HIGHWAY
WATER SUPPLY CORP. V. MORIN, 2005 WL 119933
(TEX. 2005)
In Morin, the Texas Supreme Court narrowly construed the duty a pos-
sessor of land owes to the traveling public. 61 Under the Texas Supreme
Court's decision, a possessor of land owes no duty to safely maintain
open pits on land adjoining a road if the traveling public encounters the
pit as a result of an independent accident that causes a vehicle to deviate
a short distance from the road, even if that accident was foreseeable.62
This decision severely limits causes of action against landowners that neg-
ligently maintain pits near roads and highways.
Morin involved a wrongful-death and survivorship action stemming
from an automobile accident. Mercedes Melendez Morin was driving his
car northbound, on a road with a posted speed limit of fifty-five miles per
hour, when he hit a horse that darted across the road. Because the
county where the accident occurred had no local livestock control laws,
livestock could roam freely near road traffic. After it struck the horse,
56. Id.
57. Id. at 198 (citing Aim, 717 S.W.2d at 591).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 203.
60. Id. at 204 (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997)).




Morin's vehicle veered across the median and across the southbound lane
of traffic before it entered the shoulder of the southbound lane and hit a
pit that caused the car to flip. Morin and his front-seat passenger died as
a result of this accident. 63
The defendant dug the pit to install a water meter, but failed to fill in
the pit even though the meter installation was completed months before
the accident and even though Texas Department of Transportation regu-
lations required that the pit be filled after completion of the meter instal-
lation. Further, the defendant knew for months that the pit was not
filled. The pit was between twenty and twenty-five feet from the edge of
the southbound lane and approximately 535 feet from the point of Mo-
rin's impact with the horse.64
"Several family members and the estates of Morin and [his passenger]
sued [the defendant] for negligence. '65 After a trial on the merits, the
jury found that the defendant and Morin were fifty-two percent and
forty-eight percent, respectively, responsible for the accident and
awarded damages to the plaintiffs. 66 The defendant appealed, asserting
that it owed no duty to the plaintiffs as a matter of law. 67 The court of
appeals held that the defendant owed a duty under the facts of this case. 68
The Texas Supreme Court granted review and held that the defendant
had no such duty.69
The Texas Supreme Court started with the rule that a "possessor of
land who allows an excavation to remain on the land owes a duty to per-
sons who encounter the excavation after: (1) traveling with reasonable
care on the highway; and (2) foreseeably deviating from the highway in
the ordinary course of travel.' '70 The Texas Supreme Court assumed that
Morin encountered the excavation after "traveling with reasonable care
on the highway. ' 71 Therefore, the defendant landowner owed a duty to
Morin only if Morin's deviation from the road occurred "in the ordinary
course of travel." 72
Section 368 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides that "a
traveler is not 'in the ordinary course of travel' unless the deviation from
the road is a normal incident of travel."' 73 The court stated that, in this
determination, "the distance between the highway and the condition is
frequently decisive, since those who deviate in any normal manner in the
ordinary course of travel cannot reasonably be expected to stray very
63. Id. at *1, *3.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *2.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Military Highway Water Supply Corp. v. Morin, 114 S.W.3d 728, 736,
738-39 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. granted)).
69. Id. at *1.
70. ld. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 368 (1965) (emphasis added)).
71. Id. at *3.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 368 cmt. g (emphasis added)).
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far."' 74 Accordingly, the Texas Supreme Court focused on two distances
in its analysis of whether Morin's encounter with the pit was "in the ordi-
nary course of travel": (1) the 535 foot distance between the pit and Mo-
rin's point of impact with the horse; and (2) the twenty to twenty-five foot
distance between the road's edge and the pit.
75
The Texas Supreme Court held that Morin did not deviate from road
"in the ordinary course of travel" when he hit a horse that darted onto
the road, in a county that allowed horses to roam freely next to traffic,
and his vehicle veered across the road and hit a pit only twenty to twenty-
five feet from the edge of the road.76 The court did not take into account
the foreseeability of Morin's accident-Morin veered off the road only
after he hit a horse that darted out into traffic on a road where livestock
was free to roam alongside the road.77 The Texas Supreme Court simply
stated that Morin's accident was a greater deviation from normal travel
than the deviation the Texas Supreme Court analyzed in a previous case,
De La Garza, and Morin's accident was, therefore, not within the ordi-
nary course of travel.78
In De La Garza, the Texas Supreme Court held that a driver did not
deviate from the road as a normal incident of travel when his car landed
in an excavation located within ten feet of the roadway's edge, after the
car traveled approximately 250 feet from the point where the driver fell
asleep at the wheel.79 Although De La Garza cited several decisions
from various jurisdictions with similar holdings, the Texas Supreme Court
did not explain why deviating from the road as a result of an accident was
not "in the ordinary course of travel."' 80 Morin did not shed any addi-
tional light on the subject, except that the distance traveled in encounter-
ing the pit is a factor in determining whether the landowner owes a duty
to the traveling public. 81
Based on the Texas Supreme Court holdings in Morin and De La
Garza, it is difficult to imagine any deviation from a road that would be
considered a normal incident of travel and impose a duty of due care on
74. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 368 cmt. h).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *1.
78. Id. (citing City of McAllen v. De La Garza, 898 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Tex. 1995)).
79. De La Garza, 898 S.W.2d at 810.
80. Id. at 811-12 (citing Swope v. N. Ill. Gas Co., 623 N.E.2d 841, 845 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993), appeal denied, 631 N.E.2d 719 (1994) ("it was foreseeable that truck might swerve to
miss deer and collide with embankment ten feet from the road, but this was not the type of
accident one would expect under normal driving conditions"); Fla. Power & Light Co. v.
Macias, 507 So. 2d 1113, 1115-16 (Fla. App. 1987) ("no duty owed by utility company to
driver who lost control of his car and hit utility pole, even though plaintiff alleged there
were seventeen other accidents involving defendant's poles in the same area"); Cooper v.
Unimin Corp., 639 F. Supp. 1208, 1214 (D. Idaho 1986) ("owner of sand pit owes no duty
to trespasser who left roadway to urinate because such a deviation is not in the ordinary
course of travel"); Collier v. Redbones Tavern & Rest., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 927, 930-31
(D.N.H. 1985) ("erratic and uncontrolled deviation by drunken and speeding driver is not
a normal incident of travel")).
81. Morin, 2005 WL 119933, at *3.
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an adjoining landowner. To the Texas Supreme Court, it is apparently
rarely "normal" to leave the paved surface. It appears that any deviation
from a road caused by an automobile accident, regardless of the acci-
dent's foreseeability, is not in "the ordinary course of travel." These
cases severely limit causes of action against landowners that negligently
maintain pits near roads and highways.
C. RIGHTS OF A STILLBORN FETUS UNDER THE WRONGFUL DEATH
AND SURVIVAL STATUTEs-FORT WORTH OSTEOPATHIC
Hosp. v. REESE, 148 S.W.3D 94 (TEX. 2004)
In Reese, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed that parents are prohib-
ited from bringing claims on behalf of a stillborn fetus under the Texas
wrongful death and survival statutes. 82 Apparently, Christian conserva-
tives do not have the same influence as insurers with the Texas Supreme
Court. The Texas Supreme Court also held, for the first time, that the
Texas wrongful death and survival statutes were constitutional because
parents and their stillborn fetuses were not denied equal protection of the
laws. 8
3
Tara Reese went to the "emergency room in her seventh month of
pregnancy, complaining of a racing pulse and dizziness." The doctors
"determined that she had high blood pressure and sent her to the delivery
room for observation." Although the doctors had a difficult time de-
tecting the fetus' heart tones, they did nothing to aid the fetus. In the
morning, the doctors determined that the fetus would be stillborn. The
Reeses, on behalf of their stillborn child, brought various causes of action
against the health care providers under the Texas wrongful death and sur-
vival statutes.84
"The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all health care
providers. '85 The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that
the Reeses could assert wrongful death and survival actions on behalf of
their stillborn fetus.86 The Texas Supreme Court granted the defendant
health care providers' petition for review.87
The Texas Supreme Court stated that the common law prevented re-
covery by a stillborn fetus and the Texas wrongful death and survival stat-
utes did not modify the common law because these statutes only
protected the rights of an "individual" or a "person" and thus, did not
include a stillborn fetus. 88 The common law dictated that the death of a
person extinguished all of the decedent's tort actions and third persons
82. Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp. v. Reese, 148 S.W.3d 94, 96-97 (Tex. 2004) (aff'g
727 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. 1987)).
83. Id. at 97-98.
84. Id. at 94-96.
85. Id. at 96.
86. Reese v. Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., 87 S.W.3d 203, 205 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2002, pet. granted).
87. Reese, 148 S.W.3d at 95.
88. Id. at 97.
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who suffered loss by the decedent's death, such as parents, also lost their
right to recover.89
Although the Texas Legislature enacted the wrongful death and sur-
vival statutes in 1860 and 1895 to "ameliorate this harsh result," the Texas
Supreme Court interpreted these statutes narrowly to exclude stillborn
fetuses. 90 The Texas wrongful death statute provides: "[a] person is liable
for damages arising from an injury that causes an individual's death if the
injury was caused by the person's or his agent's or servant's wrongful act,
neglect, carelessness, unskillful ness, or default." 91 And the Texas sur-
vival statute provides: "[a] cause of action for personal injury to the
health, reputation, or person of an injured person does not abate because
of the death of the injured person or because of the death of a person
liable for the injury."' 92 The Texas Supreme Court reasoned that a still-
born fetus is not an "individual" or "person," and therefore, it concluded
that the Texas Legislature did not intend to include an unborn fetus
within the scope of these statutes.93
Through contorted reasoning, the Texas Supreme Court "reconciled"
its previous decisions.94 In Brown, the Court held that a fetus that suf-
fered injuries in utero but was born alive before it later died was a "pa-
tient" and the statute of limitations for its wrongful death began to run
from the date of its pre-birth injuries.95 According to the court's logic,
there is nothing inconsistent about starting the statute of limitations for
injuries sustained while the "non-individual" and "non-person" fetus is in
utero if the fetus is born alive, but denying such a "non-individual" and
"non-person" any rights for fatal injuries sustained in utero if the fetus
does not survive at least a short time out of the womb. The pattern is
clear. If making a fetus an "individual" extinguishes its claims through
limitations, it is an "individual." However, if considering a fetus an "indi-
vidual" creates liability under the wrongful death statute, a fetus is a
"non-individual."
The Texas Supreme Court also held that the Texas wrongful death and
survival statutes, as it interpreted them to exclude cause of action by a
stillborn fetus, did not violate the equal protection clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 96 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State
shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws."
97
89. Id. at 96 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 127 at 945 (5th ed. 1984)).
90. Id. at 96-96; Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 506 (holding that parents of a stillborn fetus had
no right to bring actions under the wrongful death or survival statutes).
91. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (emphasis
added).
92. Id. § 71.021(a) (emphasis added).
93. Reese, 148 S.W.3d at 96 (citing Witty v. Am. Gen. Capital Distrib., Inc., 727 S.W.2d
503, 504 (Tex. 1987)).
94. Id. at 96-97 (citing Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 506; Brown v. Shwarts, 968 S.W.2d 331, 335
(Tex. 1998)).
95. Brown, 968 S.W.2d at 335.
96. Reese, 148 S.W.3d at 97-98.
97. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Accordingly, two classifications were at issue in Reese: (1) "the distinction
in the wrongful death statute between parents of a stillborn fetus and
parents of a child born alive;" and (2) "the distinction under the survival
statute between a fetus that dies in utero and a fetus that is born [alive]
but dies subsequent to birth."'98 The court stated that the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade settled this issue because the case held
that the unborn are not included within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which contains the Equal Protection Clause. 99 Further, the
Texas Supreme Court stated that a parent's claim for damages for the
death of a child is "entirely derivative of the child's cause of action
against a tortfeasor."' 00 Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned
that it "is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to fail to provide
parents with a claim for the wrongful death of a fetus in utero when the
Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit a legislative body from with-
holding a wrongful death cause of action from the fetus."' 01
It is also interesting to note just how blatant the Texas Legislature's
bias is in favor of the medical profession. In 2003, the Texas Legislature
granted the parents of a stillborn child a cause of action under the wrong-
ful death statute.102 But the Texas Legislature expressly excluded any
cause of action under this statute for actions brought "for the death of an
individual who is an unborn child that is brought against ... a physician
or other health care provider licensed in this state, if the death directly or
indirectly is caused by, associated with, arises out of, or relates to a lawful
medical or health care practice or procedure of the physician or health care
provider.'10 3 What is the wisdom behind denying rights to an unborn
child killed by a doctor's gross negligence but granting rights to an un-
born child killed in a car accident?
D. CRIMINAL CONVERSATION AND ALIENATION OF AFFECTION-
SMITH V. SMITH, 126 S.W.3D 660, 665-66 (TEX. APP.-
HOUSTON [14TH DIST.] 2004, NO PET.)
In Smith, an ex-wife sued her ex-husband's new wife for criminal con-
versation and alienation of affection. 10 4 The Court of Appeals in Hous-
ton upheld, as constitutional, sections of the TEXAS FAMILY CODE that
specifically abolished these two common law causes of action.105 This is
consistent with Texas tort law trends where causes of action are statuto-
98. Reese, 148 S.W.3d at 98.
99. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973)).
100. Id. (citing Diaz v. Westphal, 941 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex. 1997)).
101. Id.
102. Reese, 148 S.W.3d at 97 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.001(4)
(Vernon Supp. 2004)).
103. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.003(c)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (empha-
sis added).
104. Smith v. Smith, 126 S.W.3d 660, 664-66 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no
pet. h.).




The "open courts" provision of the Texas Constitution provides that
"[a]ll courts shall be open and every person for an injury done to him, in
his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course
of law. °1 0 7 However, there is a strong presumption that statutes are
valid.108 A statute violates the "open courts" provision of the Texas Con-
stitution only if it abrogates a well-established common law cause of ac-
tion "without a showing that the legislative basis for the statute outweighs
the denial of the right of redress."'10 9
The Court held that the Texas Legislature's abolition of the criminal
conversation cause of action was constitutional because: (1) this tort was
not a well-established common law cause of action, and (2) the legislative
basis for the statute outweighed the denial of the right of redress. 1" 0
Criminal conversation is a common law tort affording a spouse a cause of
action against a third party who engaged in sexual intercourse with the
other spouse.'11 Even though criminal conversation is an old tort with
roots in English common law, the court of appeals held that it was not an
established common law cause of action because only two years had
passed between the first Texas Supreme Court decision which recognized
this cause of action and the Texas Legislature's abolition of the cause of
action. 1 2 Further, the court of appeals held that the legislative basis for
the statute outweighed the denial of the right of redress.
The court of appeals stated that cases involving criminal conversation
were "unsavory" and "unpleasant" and even though innocent spouses
suffer from acts of marital infidelity, an award of damages will neither
alleviate their emotional distress, nor strengthen their marital ties.113 But
"unpleasant" or "unsavory" facts should not be sufficient justification to
eliminate a cause of action. Further, in other torts involving emotional
distress or damages to reputation, such as intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and slander, an award of damages might not alleviate the
emotional distress or repair the damage to reputation, but the causes of
action exist and are effective deterrents to such behavior. Although, the
106. See Michael W. Shore & Judy Shore, Personal Torts, 57 SMU L. REV. 1127, 1127
(2004).
107. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
108. Smith, 126 S.W.3d at 663 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.021 (Vernon 1998)
("it is presumed the Legislature intended (1) the statute to satisfy state and federal consti-
tutions; (2) a just and reasonable result; (3) the result to be feasible of execution; and (4) to
favor public interest over private interest")).
109. Id. at 664 (citing Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665-66 (Tex. 1983)).
110. Id. at 664-65.
111. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 402 (8th ed. 2004).
112. Smith, 126 S.W.3d at 664 (citing Felsenthal v. McMillion, 493 S.W.2d 729-30 (Tex.
1973); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.106 (Vernon 1998)). The tort of criminal conversation
has an old English common law heritage and was expressly recognized by the Supreme
Court of Texas in 1973. See Felsenthal, 493 S.W.2d at 729-30. However, two years later, as
a direct response to this supreme court decision, the Texas Legislature abolished the cause
of action. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.106 (Vernon 1998) ("[a] right of action by one
spouse against a third party for criminal conversation is not authorized in this state").
113. Smith, 126 S.W.3d at 664 (citing Felsenthal, 493 S.W.2d at 730-31).
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court of appeals stated that the tort of criminal conversation is not an
effective deterrent, it provided no discussion to support this conclu-
sion.114 On the other hand, the court of appeals stated that infidelity is a
factor that is considered in divorce. 115 Under the court of appeals' ratio-
nale, the aggrieved spouse would need to file for divorce and extract a
greater settlement as an effective redress. But this is not redress against
the third party. Further, the court of appeals stated that the besmirched
spouse might have a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress against the third party.11 6 But this cause of action has a very high
threshold of "extreme and outrageous" conduct and the court did not
note a single case where a plaintiff was successful in bringing such a cause
of action.117
The court of appeals also held that the Texas Legislature's abolition of
the alienation of affection cause of action was constitutional because the
legislative basis for the statute outweighs the denial of the right of re-
dress.118 The common law tort of alienation of affection is a cause of
action for willful or malicious interference with a marriage by a third
party without justification or cause. 119 The court of appeals found that
alienation of affection was an old English common law tort that is well
established in Texas. 120 But the Court held that the legislative basis for
the statute outweighed the denial of the right of redress. 121 The court of
appeals stated that "the cost to defend such a suit is great and the harmed
spouse rarely recovers. '1 22 The Legislature referred to alienation of af-
fection as an outdated common law that had no place in modern soci-
ety.123 It is not clear what the court or the legislature meant by modern
society-perhaps it is a society free of responsibilities that can be re-
dressed in the courts. Based on this, the court stated that this cause of
action had limited value.' 24 Further, the Court stated that the harmed
spouse could use such infidelity to extract a greater division of assets in a
114. Id. Similarly, the dissent in Felsenthal did not justify its argument that the tort of
criminal conversation has no deterrent effect. Felsenthal, 493 S.W.2d at 731.
115. Smith, 126 S.W.3d at 665 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (Vernon 1998);
Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698-99 (Tex. 1981)).
116. Id. (citing Twymon v. Twymon, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621-22 (Tex. 1993).
117. Id. (citing Stites v. Gillum, 872 S.W.2d 786, 793-94 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994,
writ denied) (recognizing a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
against third parties for adultery, but the action was not properly before the court in this
case)).
118. Smith, 126 S.W.3d at 665.
119. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 80 (8th ed. 2004).
120. Smith, 126 S.W.3d at 665. The tort of alienation of affection was first recognized
by the Texas Supreme Court in 1971. Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 475 (Tex. 1990).
The Texas Legislature did not abolish this cause of action until 1987. TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 1.107 (Vernon 2004) ("[a] right of action by one spouse against a third party for
alienation of affection is not authorized in this state.").
121. Smith, 126 S.W.3d at 666.
122. Id.
123. Id.; Hearings on HB 203 Before the House Comm. on Judiciary, 70th Leg., R.S.
(March 16, 1987).
124. Smith, 126 S.W.3d at 666.
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divorce case. 125 Society is represented in our justice system by juries. If a
claim has no basis in our modem philandering, promiscuous and adulter-
ous society, the jury can find for the defendant. This is a clear example of
judicial legislation.
E. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS UNDER THE
SURVIVAL STATUTE-CORTEZ v. HCCI-SAN ANTONIO, INC.,
131 S.W.3D 113, 120 (TEX. APP.-SAN ANTONIO
2004, PET. GRANTED)
In Cortez, a case concerning physical and emotional abuse of an elderly
woman in a nursing home, the Court of Appeals in San Antonio bucked
the trend on statutory interpretation and preserved a cause of action. 126
The court of appeals held that a claim of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress is recoverable under the survival statute.127 However, peti-
tion was granted, so the Texas Supreme Court will get an opportunity to
eliminate this cause of action as well. This decision confirms that causes
of action for non-physical injuries to the person fall within the survival
statute. 128
Under the survival statute, "[a] cause of action for personal injury to
the health, reputation, or person of an injured person does not abate be-
cause of the death of the injured person .... ",129 Therefore, a personal
injury action that falls within the statute survives the injured person's
death and may be prosecuted on her behalf.130 The cause of action in a
survival action is "that which the decedent suffered before [his] death. ' 13'
And the damages recoverable are those -the decedent sustained while
alive. 132
No Texas court previously addressed whether a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress was recoverable under the Texas survival
statute. 133 But the court of appeals acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit
interpreted the Texas survival statute to exclude such a claim "because
that tort does not injure health, reputation, or body" as required by the
statute.134 The Fifth Circuit appeared to interpret the Texas survival stat-
125. Id.
126. Cortez v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., 131 S.W.3d 113, 120 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2004, pet. granted).
127. Id.
128. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.021(a) (Vernon 1997).
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.021(b); Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
841 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1992).
131. Russell, 841 S.W.2d at 345.
132. Id.
133. Cortez, 131 S.W.3d at 120.
134. Plumley v. Landmark Chevrolet, Inc., 122 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 1997); see also
Estate of Martineau v. ARCO Chem. Co., 203 F.3d 904, 913 (5th Cir. 2000) (relying on




ute as applying only to causes of action for physical injuries. 135
In light of Texas Supreme Court decisions that recognized the recovery
of mental anguish damages in actions under the Texas survival statute,
the court of appeals did not find the Fifth Circuit's decision persuasive. 136
Because claims for mental anguish do not require proof of physical injury
and are recoverable under the survival statute, the court of appeals held
that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, similarly,
should survive the claimant's death. 137
F. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-TExAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE V. SIMONS, 140 S.W.3D 338, 339 (TEX. 2004); UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER V. LOUTZENHISER, 140
S.W.3D 351 (TEx. 2004); SAN ANTONIO STATE Hosp. V. COWAN, 128
S.W.3D 244 (TEX. 2004)
In 2004, the Texas Supreme Court provided further guidance for deter-
mining waiver of governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims
Act. In two cases, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the notice provi-
sion, examining issues related to the applicability of the provision as well
as its jurisdictional implications. The Texas Supreme Court further ex-
amined the definition of "use" in the context of the personal property
exception to sovereign immunity.
Section 101.101 of the Texas Tort Claims Act provides that "a govern-
mental unit is entitled to receive formal, written notice of a claim against
it within six months of the incident from which the claim arises unless it
has actual notice of the claim, including knowledge of its 'alleged fault
producing or contributing to the death, injury, or property damage."138
The applicable portions of section 101.101 are as follows:
(a) A governmental unit is entitled to receive notice of a claim
against it under this chapter not later than six months after the
day that the incident giving rise to the claim occurred. The notice
must reasonably describe:
(1) the damage or injury claimed;
(2) the time and place of the incident; and
(3) the incident.
135. Plumley, 122 F.3d at 311. The Plumley court reached its conclusion after no dis-
cussion or analysis, and with only a citation to the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in
Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 598 (Tex. 1993), in which the Texas Supreme Court held
that it was "not imposing a requirement that emotional distress manifest itself physically to
be compensable."
136. Cortez, 131 S.W.3d at 120 (citing Kramer v. Lewisville Mem'l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d
397, 403 (Tex. 1993); Bedgood v. Madalin, 600 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1980); Harris County
Hosp. Dist. v. Estrada, 872 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ
denied)).
137. Cortez, 131 S.W.3d at 120.
138. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 339 (Tex. 2004) (quoting
Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam)).
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(c) The notice requirement[] provided . . . by Subsection[] (a) . ..
doles] not apply if the governmental unit has actual notice that
death has occurred, that the claimant has received some injury, or
that the claimant's property has been damaged.' 39
In Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Simons, the Texas Supreme
Court granted petition for review, recognizing that "[t]he court of appeals
[had] differed over exactly what . . . knowledge of alleged fault entails
" 140
Prior to Simons, the Texas Supreme Court held that "actual notice to a
governmental unit requires knowledge of (1) a death, injury, or property
damage; (2) the governmental unit's alleged fault producing or contribut-
ing to the death, injury, or property damage; and (3) the identity of the
parties involved.'' a Simons noted that the application of this standard
varied among appellate courts from the narrow view that "to have actual
notice, the governmental unit must have the same information it would
have had if the claimant had complied with the formal notice require-
ments, 142 to the broader view that "an incident itself gives actual notice
if it should trigger an investigation that would or could show the govern-
mental unit at fault.' 43 Simons elaborated that in order to satisfy the
second element of actual notice set forth in Cathey, a governmental unit
should "have knowledge that amounts to the same notice to which it is
entitled by section 101.101(a),"'144 including "subjective awareness of...
fault.' 45 As the Texas Supreme Court stated, "[g]overnmental entities
have actual notice to the extent that a prudent entity could ascertain its
potential liability stemming from an incident, either by conducting a fur-
ther investigation or because of its obvious role in contributing to the
incident.' 46 The court, however, carefully circumscribed this rule, stat-
ing that "[i]t is not enough that a governmental unit should have investi-
gated an incident as a prudent person would have, or that it did
investigate, perhaps as part of routine safety procedures, or that it should
have known from the investigation it conducted that it might have been
at fault.' 47
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Loutzenhiser,148
the Texas Supreme Court also addressed application of the term "inci-
dent" in section 101.101(a) for injuries that occur in utero. Stephen Lout-
zenhiser was born on August 15, 1992 with a deformed left hand. Eight
139. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101 (Vernon 1997).
140. Simons, 140 S.W.3d at 339.
141. Cathey, 900 S.W.2d at 341.
142. Nat'l Sports & Spirit, Inc. v. Univ. of N. Tex., 117 S.W.3d 76, 80 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2003, no pet.).
143. Simons, 140 S.W.3d at 346 (summarizing Crane County v. Saults, 101 S.W.3d 764,
769 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, no pet. h.)).
144. Id. at 347.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 346.
147. Id. at 347-48.
148. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Center v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. 2004).
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months earlier, in January 1992, two chorionic villus samplings were per-
formed, which "involves inserting a needle through the uterus into the
chorion-the section of the placenta providing the fetus with nutrients via
its blood supply-and removing a part of it for chromosomal testing.
149
Seventeen days after the birth, Stephen's father gave notice to the hospi-
tal of his son's birth defect. Since this notice occurred more than six
months after the tests were performed, the Medical Center moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that section 101.101(a) had not been
satisfied. However, the Texas Supreme Court determined that the test
alone was only one incident necessary to Stephen's claim and that
"equally necessary to the existence of the claim, was Stephen's live
birth. 150 Noting "the longstanding common law rule [is] that the rights
of a fetus [are] contingent on live birth,"1 51 the court held that since "Ste-
phen's live birth was an incident giving rise to his claim, and one essential
to the existence of the claim," the notice provision's six-month period
would not begin until Stephen was born.152
In section 101.021(2) of the Texas Torts Claims Act, governmental im-
munity is waived for "personal injury and death so caused by a condition
or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit
would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to
Texas law.' 53 In San Antonio State Hosp. v. Cowan,154 the Texas Su-
preme Court addressed what constituted a "use" in order to trigger this
waiver. The plaintiff, James Roy Cowan, Jr. committed suicide in a hos-
pital, using his suspenders and a piece of pipe from his walker. A probate
court ordered that the hospital "[take] possession of Cowan's personal
effects, including his suspenders and walker"' 55 and the hospital had
done so. However, the hospital proceeded to "allow [Cowan] to keep
these latter items with him."'1 6 The Texas Supreme Court stated that
section 101.021(2) immunity is only waived "when the governmental unit
is itself the user."'1 57 The court of appeals held "that the [h]ospital used
Cowan's walker and suspenders by giving them to him to use."'1 58 The
Texas Supreme Court reversed, stating that "[a] governmental unit does
not 'use' personal property merely by allowing someone else to use it and
nothing more."'159
149. Id. at 354.
150. Id. at 356.
151. Id. (quoting Edinburg Hosp. Auth. v. Trevino, 941 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. 1997) (citing
Witty v. Am. Gen. Capital Distribs., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1987)) (also discussing
Krishnan v. Sepulveda, 916 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex. 1995); Pietila v. Crites, 851 S.W.2d 185,
186 (Tex. 1993); and Yandell v. Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1971)).
152. Id.
153. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1997).
154. San Antonio State Hosp. v. Cowan, 128 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. 2004).
155. Id. at 245.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 246.
158. Id. (discussing San Antonio State Hosp. v. Cowan, 75 S.W.3d 19 (Tex. App.-San





In order to establish causation, the totality of the evidence must be
weighed to determine whether the alleged negligence is responsible for
the plaintiff's harm. Traditionally, it is the jury's responsibility, not the
judiciary's, to make this critical determination. 160 However, the Texas
Supreme Court recently exhibited a propensity for weighing the evidence
on review and substituting its opinion for that of the jury.
In Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Ramirez,161 the Texas Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals judgment that affirmed a jury's find-
ing of negligence. The case involved a highway accident where the plain-
tiff's Volkswagen Passat bumped a neighboring car and veered over the
median, eventually colliding head-on into an oncoming Ford Mustang.
The plaintiff alleged that a defect in the rear wheel assembly caused the
wheel to fail and led to loss of control of the vehicle. However, the wheel
was found lodged within the wheel well 500 yards away from the point
that the vehicle began to veer over the median. It was the defendant's
position that the impact with the neighboring car caused the plaintiff to
veer off course and that the damage to the wheel occurred upon impact
with the oncoming car.162
According to the Texas Supreme Court, the only evidence supporting
the plaintiff's position was the testimony of two experts and the video-
taped statement of a witness made to reporters at the scene of the acci-
dent. Plaintiff's expert Ronald Walker testified that the wheel remained
lodged in the wheel well because "even with the wheel dropping off, the
wheel wanted to still have the capability of going faster than the vehicle
because it wasn't being slowed down as much by friction. 1 63 The Texas
Supreme Court stated that "Walker did not conduct or cite any tests to
support his theory that the [the car's] left wheel could and did remain
pocketed in the wheel well as the car veered off U.S. 83, crossed the me-
dian, and collided with the Mustang. ' 164 As a result, the Texas Supreme
Court ruled that his testimony was "unreliable and constitute[d] no evi-
dence of causation." 165
The Texas Supreme Court also discounted the testimony of the eyewit-
ness, ruling that it was inadmissible hearsay evidence. The court of ap-
peals ruled that the testimony was admissible under the "excited
utterance" exception to the hearsay rule. The Texas Supreme Court con-
cluded that the excited utterance did not apply because the evidence indi-
cated that the witness's statements were "calmly given . . . after an
opportunity for deliberation, rather than made as a spontaneous reaction
160. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. Femmons, 50 S.W.3d 103, 126 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
2004, no pet. h.).
161. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, No. 02-0557, 2004 WL 3019227 (Tex. 2004).
162. Id. at *1.
163. Id. at *4.




to the accident."'1 66 The fact that the statement was admissible as infor-
mation relied upon by an expert was not addressed.
Thus, according to the Texas Supreme Court, the only evidence re-
maining to support the plaintiff's position was the testimony of Edward
Cox, the Ramirezes' metallurgy expert. The Texas Supreme Court ex-
amined this evidence to "determine whether more than a scintilla of evi-
dence exist[ed] to raise a fact issue on the question of causation."'1 67 The
Texas Supreme Court pointed out that Cox's testimony was primarily re-
lated to the defective condition of the car's wheel. According to the
court, "Cox's testimony fail[ed] to answer a crucial question raised by the
Ramirezes' theory of causation-how the floating wheel stayed in the
wheel well as the Passat traveled through the median and collided with
the Mustang."'1 68 Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court held that there
was no evidence to sustain a finding that the alleged defect proximately
caused the accident. Justice Hecht, in his concurrence, asserted that
Cox's conclusions could only be supported by his "[p]ersonal credibility"
and that "we require more of an expert witness, lest a very convincing
charlatan in a lab jacket pull the wool over laymen's eyes.' 169
The Texas Supreme Court was clearly obsessed with the "floating
wheel" theory, essentially requiring that a scientific explanation for this
specific occurrence be provided in order for causation to be established.
It selectively asserted that the only evidence offered by Cox was his ob-
servation that grass was found in the wheel hub. 170 According to Cox,
this tended to establish that the wheel had already broken by the time the
vehicle crossed the median. This alone would at least appear to be some
evidence explaining the "floating wheel." But why is this single issue so
critical? Certainly, it is puzzling that the wheel would remain within the
wheel well, but it hardly seems to be the only factor considered by the
jury. As the dissent pointed out, Cox specifically noted three defects in
the vehicle:
First, based on microscopic tearing at the base of the threads in the
adjustment nut, which holds the bearing assembly intact, he con-
tended that the nut was looser than it should have been. Second,
based on false brinell marks of the rollers within the bearing assem-
bly, he concluded that the bearing assembly was damaged in transit
because the car was cinched down too tightly. Third, based on the
presence of cracking and metal fragments in the bearing assembly,
Cox concluded that the metal in the assembly became embrittled by
temperature inconsistencies in the manufacturing process. He testi-
fied that the embrittled material structure led to cracks, which cre-
ated steel bearing fragments that were found embedded in the roller
166. Id. at *9.
167. Id. at *10 (citing Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d
227, 233 (Tex. 2004); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.
1997)).
168. Ramirez, 2004 WL 3019227, at *11.
169. Id. at *12.
170. Id. at *10.
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cage of the Passat, trapped between the inner and outer races and
embedded in the surface of the rollers. 1
71
It was also undisputed that the emergency brake did not engage until
the Passat collided with the Mustang. After the accident, the markings
on the brake pads indicated that the rotor was off center, which tended to
establish that the wheel had broken prior to impact. 172 As the dissent
pointed out "[w]hile Cox's causation testimony is neither ironclad nor
exhaustive, it is surely some evidence that the Passat's bearing failure oc-
curred in the eastbound lane, contributed to Sperling's loss of control,
and ultimately caused a catastrophic accident in the westbound lane.
173
Reviewers must be careful not to let a charlatan in a justice's robe con-
vince them evidence in the record does not exist.
IV. DAMAGES
A. PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY UNDER THE DRAM SHOP Acr-F.F.P.
OPERATING PARTNERS, L.P. v. DUEEZ, No. 02-0381, 2004
WL 1966008 (TEX. SEPT. 3, 2004)
In this 5-4 split dram shop opinion, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed
a $35 million verdict to the Duefiez plaintiffs for their injuries caused by
an intoxicated driver. While the Texas Supreme Court reached the same
result as the lower courts, the majority rejected the idea that liability
under the Dram Shop Act cannot be apportioned.174 The majority held
that apportionment of responsibility under the Proportionate Responsi-
bility Act applies to all claims brought under the Dram Shop Act, but it
nevertheless held that the alcohol provider or "dram shop" is responsible
for both its share of the verdict and the share of the verdict assigned to an
intoxicated patron. The provider may then recover from the intoxicated
patron based upon the percentages of responsibility that the jury appor-
tions between them. 175
The dissent accused the majority of saying one thing and doing an-
other, arguing that the Texas Supreme Court's actual holding does not
require apportionment of responsibility but instead makes a provider of
alcohol joint and severally liable to a claimant for one-hundred percent of
the damages regardless of the percentage of responsibility assigned by a
jury.176 If the dissent had its way, juries would be allowed to apportion
dram shop responsibility owed to innocent third parties between the in-
toxicated patron and the intoxicant provider. This is troublesome be-
cause juries in dram shop cases are likely to apportion most, if not all, of
the responsibility to the intoxicated patron, which would render the
171. Id. at *14.
172. Id. at *16.
173. Id.
174. F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duefiez, No. 02-0381, 2004 WL 1966008 (Tex.
Sept. 3, 2004).
175. Id. at *1.
176. Id. at *7.
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Dram Shop Act meaningless, "at least to the extent the intoxicated pa-
tron proves to be insolvent. 1 77
In this case, the Duefiezes were severely injured when their car was
struck head-on by an intoxicated driver who purchased alcohol minutes
earlier from a Mr. Cut Rate convenience store owned by F.F.P. Operat-
ing Partners, L.P. ("F.F.P."). The driver, Roberto Ruiz, purchased a
twelve pack of beer from the store's assistant manager, Carol Solis, after
consuming a case-and-a-half of beer that afternoon.1 78
After purchasing the beer, Ruiz left the store, got into his truck, placed
an open beer between his legs, and drove away. Ruiz drove onto a
nearby highway where witnesses observed him swerving into oncoming
traffic several times. Two drivers dodged his truck to avoid a collision.179
The Duefiezes were not as lucky. Less than a mile away from the Mr.
Cut Rate store, Ruiz crossed over the center line of traffic and hit the
Duefiezes' car head-on.1 80 All five members of the Duefiez family were
injured. Nine-year-old Ashley "suffered a traumatic brain injury and will
require round-the-clock care for the rest of her life."' 181 "Xavier Duefiez,
a corrections officer, also suffered some degree of permanent brain
damage." 182
The Duefiezes sued F.F.P. and Ruiz, among others, and F.F.P filed a
cross-action against Ruiz, naming him as a responsible third party. The
Duefiezes then nonsuited all defendants except F.F.P. There were no al-
legations of negligence against the plaintiffs. 183
At a pretrial conference, the trial court held that Chapter 33 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code's provisions on proportionate
responsibility did not apply to this type of case, and severed F.F.P.'s
cross-action against Ruiz. At trial, the judge did not allow the jury to
consider Ruiz's percentage of responsibility for apportionment, and the
jury returned a $35 million verdict solely against F.F.P.184
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court, holding:
[I]n third party actions under the Dram Shop Act in which there are
no allegations of negligence on the part of the plaintiffs, a provider is
vicariously liable for the damages caused by an intoxicated person,
and such a provider is not entitled to offset its liability by that of the
intoxicated person. 185
In reaching that conclusion, the court of appeals narrowed the Smith v.
177. Id. at *5.






184. Id. at *2.
185. Id. (citing F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 69 S.W.3d 800, 805 (Tex.




Sewell decision, 186 in which the Texas Supreme Court held that the com-
parative responsibility statute applies to all dram shop cases. 187 The court
of appeals distinguished Sewell, concluding that comparative responsibil-
ity applies in dram shop cases only when the intoxicated patron sues for
his own injuries, and not when the plaintiff is an innocent third party
injured by an intoxicated patron. 188
The Texas Supreme Court took issue with the court of appeals' applica-
tion of its Sewell opinion to this case and granted F.F.P.'s petition for
review to address the effect of Chapter 33 to dram shop cases. 189 The
Texas Supreme Court began its analysis by quoting Chapter 33 of the
Proportionate Responsibility Act, which applies to "any cause of action
based on tort in which a defendant, settling person, or responsible third
party is found responsible for a percentage of the harm for which relief is
sought." 190 Chapter 33 requires the trier of fact to apportion responsibil-
ity "with respect to each person's causing or contributing to cause in any
way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought."191
The Texas Supreme Court noted that Chapter 33 "expressly excludes
certain types of cases from its coverage, such as workers' compensation
cases, but it does not exclude actions brought under the Dram Shop
Act."'1 92 For this reason, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the
Legislature intended all types of tort cases, not expressly excluded, to be
subject to apportionment. 193
The Texas Supreme Court noted if dram shop liability were purely vica-
rious, as the court of appeals held, there would be nothing for the jury to
apportion. 194 But a dram shop's liability stems in part from its own
wrongful conduct, not just from the acts of the intoxicated patron.195 Cit-
ing Sewell, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned that "[a]lthough the
[Dram Shop] Act ties causation to the intoxicated patron's actions, cer-
tainly dram shop liability was fashioned on the notion that providing alco-
hol to one who is obviously intoxicated to the extent that the public is
clearly endangered 'contributes [in some] way' to harm that the intoxica-
tion causes."'1 96
Referencing the Restatement for support, the Texas Supreme Court
concluded that "a party to whom liability is imputed and who is also inde-
pendently liable 'is responsible for the share of the verdict assigned to
[the party whose liability is imputed] and is also responsible for the share
186. Smith v. Sewell, 858 S.W.2d 350, 356 (Tex. 1993).
187. F.F.P. Operating Partners, 2004 WL 1966008, at *2.
188. Id. (citing F.F.P. Operating Partners, 69 S.W.3d at 805).
189. Id.
190. Id. at *3 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.002(a) (Vernon 1997)).
191. Id. (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.003 (Vernon 1997)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at *4.
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing Sewell, 858 S.W.2d at 356).
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of the verdict assigned to its own negligence.'"ll 97 This means that "the
resulting judgment in dram shop cases should aggregate the dram shop's
and driver's liability so that the plaintiff can fully recover from the pro-
vider without assuming the risk of the driver's insolvency."'1 98 The "dram
shop may then recover from the driver based upon the percentages of
responsibility that the jury assess[es] between them."199
The Texas Supreme Court ultimately held that even though the court of
appeals failed to apportion responsibility between F.F.P. and Ruiz, its
judgment was correct because F.F.P. was responsible to the Duefiezes for
its own liability and for Ruiz's imputed liability.200
The dissent disagreed with the majority's effective holding, i.e., that a
provider of alcohol should be vicariously liable for a patron's intoxica-
tion.20 1 The dissent accused the majority of actually overruling the Texas
Supreme Court's Smith v. Sewell decision, which made no mention of vi-
carious liability at all, only proportionate responsibility. 202
Although the Dram Shop Act imposes liability on providers "for the
actions of their... customers,"20 3 the dissent argued that the Texas Legis-
lature did not intend for an alcohol provider to be one-hundred percent
liable for the damages caused by an intoxicated patron to an innocent
third party.2°4 The dissent dismissed the majority's point that the legisla-
tive intent of the Dram Shop Act was to hold providers responsible in the
event the intoxicated patron proves to be insolvent, stating that, in enact-
ing the Proportionate Responsibility Act, "the Texas Legislature made
hard choices and charted a course that this Court must uphold. '205 The
dissent concluded that, given the express exceptions to the proportionate
responsibility scheme, the Dram Shop Act "cannot reasonably be read to
require vicarious liability and joint and several liability in lieu of propor-
tionate responsibility for alcohol providers. '206
B. PROPOSED LEGISLATION LIMITING LIABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONS
PROVIDING CHILD WELFARE SERVICES-2005 TEXAS HOUSE
BILL No. 478
On January 18, 2005, Texas Representative Toby Goodman introduced
a bill to be enacted "relating to the operation of the child protective ser-
vices and foster care system. 20 7 The bill proposes privatization of substi-
tute child care services statewide and caps the liability of agencies
197. Id. at *5 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
§ 7 cmt. j (2000)).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at *6.
201. Id. at *7.
202. Id. at *8.
203. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 2.03 (Vernon 1995) (emphasis added).
204. F.F.P. Operating Partners, 2004 WL 1966008, at *9.
205. Id. at *11.
206. Id. at *14.
207. Tex. H.B. 478, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005).
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providing child welfare services on behalf of the state.20 8 This proposed
limit on liability is the latest example of the Texas Legislature's attempt
to scale back the power of juries and dictate what is socially reasonable or
unreasonable conduct.
The damages cap is found in section 21 of the bill; it would amend
Chapter 97 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code to read:
Sec. 97.003. LIMIT ON LIABILITY OF CERTAIN ORGANIZA-
TIONS PROVIDING CHILD WELFARE SERVICES.
(a) In an action on a liability claim in which a final judgment is ren-
dered against a nonprofit agency that provides child welfare ser-
vices on behalf of the state to children in the conservatorship of
the state, the limit of civil liability for noneconomic damages in-
clusive of all persons and entities for which vicarious liability
theories may apply is a total amount, including prejudgment in-
terest, not to exceed $250,000 for each person and $500,000 for
each single occurrence of bodily injury or death.
(b) The limitation on civil liability does not apply to reckless con-
duct or intentional, wilful [sic], or wanton misconduct of a non-
profit agency.209
Improving child protective services should be a top priority of the
Texas Legislature, but privatizing child welfare services is a risky proposi-
tion. Limiting liability of the child welfare service providers is particu-
larly dangerous because the caps make it economically feasible for them
to commit negligent acts. The service providers should know that if they
fail to provide reasonable services, they will be held accountable for the
fullest extent of their liability.
V. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
A. DISCOVERY PROCEDURE UNDER THE TEXAS MEDICAL LIABILITY
ACT-IN RE MILLER, 133 S.W.3D 816 (TEX. APP.-
BEAUMONT 2004)
As if the Texas Medical Liability Act were not procedurally restrictive
enough on plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals in Beaumont added another
restriction. The court of appeals construed the Texas Medical Liability
Act to preclude plaintiffs from orally deposing defendant physicians prior
to filing the required expert report. 210
In this case, Sandra Edgerton sued Dr. Barry R. Miller for medical
malpractice. After filing suit, Edgerton noticed the oral deposition of
Miller, and Miller moved to quash it. Edgerton filed a motion to compel
Miller's deposition, which the trial court granted. Miller filed a petition
for writ of mandamus, arguing that the stay of discovery provision in the
recently enacted Texas Medical Liability Act bars plaintiffs from orally
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. In re Miller, 133 S.W.3d 816 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet. h.).
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deposing a defendant physician prior to the required expert report.211
Section 74.351 of the Texas Medical Liability Act contains the follow-
ing provisions regarding discovery:
(s) Until a claimant has served the expert report and curriculum vi-
tae as required by Subsection (a) [of section 74.351], all discovery
in a health care liability claim is stayed except for the acquisition
by the claimant of information, including medical or hospital
records or other documents or tangible things, related to the pa-
tient's health care through: (1) written discovery as defined in
Rule 192.7, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) depositions on
written questions under Rule 200, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure;
and (3) discovery from nonparties under Rule 205, Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(u) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, after a claim
is filed all claimants, collectively, may take not more than two
depositions before the expert report is served as required by
Subsection (a). 2 1 2
Miller contended that subsection (u) narrows subsection (s), limiting
the allowed depositions upon written questions to two before filing of ex-
pert reports.213 He argued that "because oral depositions are not the al-
lowed discovery in subsection (s), ... they are not authorized by
subsection (u)."'214
Edgerton acknowledged that subsection (u) limits the number of pre-
expert report depositions to two, but asserted that the Legislature in-
tended subsection (u) to allow two oral depositions of parties or nonpar-
ties, "notwithstanding" the provisions of subsection (S).215 Edgerton
noted that the common meaning of "notwithstanding" is "in spite of."'2 16
Pre-report discovery, including oral depositions, is necessary for the
creation of a meaningful, intelligent expert report.217 Oral depositions
are particularly necessary in cases where the plaintiff is complaining of
inadequate medical documentation as part of the overall medical negli-
gence. The legislature realized this when it wrote subsection (u), ex-
pressly allowing the claimants to take two depositions before the expert
report is served.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals accepted Miller's argument, holding
that section (u) limits the number of depositions allowed by subsection
(s)-depositions upon written questions-to two. The court of appeals
concluded that any oral depositions stayed under subsection (s) are not
authorized by subsection (u) and that "the trial court erred in compelling
211. Id. at 816-17.
212. Id. at 817 (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.351(s), (u) (Vernon
Supp. 2004)) (emphasis in original).
213. Id.
214. Id.





Miller's oral deposition before the service of the expert report". 218
B. THE DEFINITION OF "NuISANCE"-SCHNEIDER NATIONAL
CARRIERS, INC. V. BATES, 147 S.W.3D 264 (TEX. 2004)
In Schneider, the Texas Supreme Court refined and distinguished the
definitions of "temporary nuisance" and "permanent nuisance.''219 The
Texas Supreme Court also provided guidance on the application of these
definitions to nuisance facts, although, traditionally, it was left to jurors to
decide material factual disputes about frequency, duration, and extent of
nuisance conditions. 220 This is often a critical factual determination, be-
cause whether a nuisance claim is "temporary" or "permanent" affects
when the claim accrues for limitations purposes. Here, the Texas Su-
preme Court characterized the plaintiffs' nuisance claims as permanent as
a matter of law, and thus barred by limitations.221
The plaintiffs, Andrea Bates and seventy-eight other individuals, lived
near the Houston Ship Channel. The defendants operated a trucking
firm; a painting and sandblasting business; and plants that manufactured
bleach, wood preservatives, polyesters, and other chemical products. The
plaintiffs complained that air contaminants, odors, lights, and noise from
the plants interfered with their right to use and enjoy their property.
They asserted, among other claims, a nuisance cause of action against the
defendants. 222
The defendants characterized the plaintiffs' allegations as a permanent
nuisance and moved for summary judgment based on limitations.22 3 The
trial court granted the defendants' motions, but the court of appeals re-
versed, finding a fact question as to whether the alleged nuisances were
temporary or permanent. 224 The Texas Supreme Court granted the peti-
tion to clarify the distinction as a matter of law.225
The limitations period for a nuisance claim is two years, but the accrual
date is not defined by statute.226 The accrual date is a question of law for
the courts.227 For over a century, the Texas Supreme Court has held that
accrual of a nuisance claim depends on whether it is permanent or tempo-
rary.228 "A permanent nuisance claim accrues when the [plaintiff's] in-
jury first occurs or is discovered; [while] a temporary nuisance claim
accrues anew upon each injury."'229
218. Id. at 818-19.
219. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 2004).
220. Id. at 275.
221. Id. at 268.
222. Id. at 267-68.
223. Id. at 269.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 268.
226. Id. at 270.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. (emphasis in original).
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For over one-hundred years in Texas, a permanent nuisance has been
defined as one that involves "an activity of such a character and existing
under such circumstances that it will be presumed to continue indefi-
nitely. ' 230 A nuisance is permanent if it is "constant and continuous" and
"injury constantly and regularly recurs. '"231
On the other hand, a "nuisance is temporary if it is of limited dura-
tion."'2 32 A nuisance is temporary if it is uncertain whether any future
injury will occur, or if future injury is likely to occur "only at long inter-
vals."'233 A nuisance is also considered temporary if it is "occasional, in-
termittent or recurrent" or "sporadic and contingent upon some irregular
force such as rain." 234
The Texas Supreme Court noted that the definitions of permanent nui-
sance and temporary nuisance have remained relatively constant in Texas
for many years, but the application of these definitions to the facts of
each case was a "continuing problem. '235 The difficulty in applying the
standard definitions stems from the relative nature of the terms in-
volved.236 Whether a nuisance is "temporary" or "permanent" obviously
turns on a factual inquiry, such as how long the nuisance lasts or how
often it occurs.237
In the past, jurors were left to decide material factual disputes about
the frequency, duration, and extent of nuisance conditions. 238 In this
case, the Texas Supreme Court indicated that it did not trust jurors to
apply the law to the facts without fashioning a "clear standard of refer-
ence" for the relative nuisance terms. 239 The Texas Supreme Court held:
[A] nuisance should be deemed temporary only if it is so irregular or
intermittent over the period leading up to filing and trial that future
injury cannot be estimated with reasonable centrality [sic]. Con-
versely, a nuisance should be deemed permanent if it is sufficiently
constant or regular (no matter how long between occurrences) that
future impact can be reasonably evaluated. Jurors should be asked
to settle the question only to the extent there is a dispute regarding
what interference has occurred or whether it is likely to continue.2 40
Applying these standards to the present case, the Texas Supreme Court
found, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs' alleged nuisances were per-
manent, ignoring their contentions that fact questions were raised. 241





235. Id. at 273.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 275.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 281.
241. Id. at 290-91.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The trend in personal tort law continues to deviate from the traditional
common law approach and moves toward rigid standards that replaces
the wisdom of juries considering specific circumstances with the wisdom
of legislatures considering abstract concepts of macroeconomics. The
Texas Legislature continues to create statutory guidelines in an ad hoc
manner in response to intense lobbying pressures from special interest
groups. The Texas Supreme Court continues to remove decisions from
juries to create its own judge-made rules of reasonable and unreasonable
conduct. The net result is an increasingly inflexible and dissociated legal
system that denies parties a fair opportunity to redress their specific inju-
ries in light of their specific circumstances. The dictates of the state are
replacing the citizen juror, and no one seems to care about, much less
fear, the result.
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